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This paper addresses several fundamental issues raised by recent 
developments in the world economy and considers their implications for 
the design and functioning of the international monetary  system.  We do 
not make any proposals. 
The four issues examined in  the paper are: 
(1)  Can the exchange rate regime do much to discipline fiscal 
policy?; 
(2)  What are the extent and costs of reduced monetary independence 
under greater fixity of exchange  rates?; 
(3)  How can the equilibrium exchange rate best be determined?; 
(4)  Does a well functioning international monetary  system require 
a clearly defined set of rules, an acknowledged leader, and an explicit 
anchor? 
Jacob A. Fremkel 
International Monetary Fumd 
700 19th Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC  20431 
Morris Goldsteim 
International Monetary Fund 
700 19th Street N.W. 
Washington, DC  20431 I.  tntroduction */ 
I.  This paper addresses several fundamental issues raised by 
recent developments in the world economy and considers their implications 
for the design and functioning of the international monetary system. 
We do not make any proposals.  Our purpose instead is  to identify 
factors that  merit attention in any serious examination of the system. 
2.  First, some background.  Over the past two—and—a—half years, 
the international economic landscape in the industrIal world has been 
dominated by the following key developments. 
To begin with, there have been unprecedented current account 
imbalances for  the  three largest economies.  Last year,  the United 
States recorded a current account deficit of $160 billion, while Japan 
and the Federal Republic of Germany registered surpluses of $85  billion 
and $43 bilLion, respectively; see  Table 1.  A primary objective of 
policy has been to reduce these external imbalances while still 
maintaining satisfactory  growth of  the world  economy.  The  contribution 
that  fiscal policy  should  make  to reducing absorption  relative to 
output  in the  United States, and to increasing it in surplus countries, 
has  become an integral——and often a contentious——element in the policy 
dialogue.  Suffice  to  say  that  the adjustment of  fiscal  positions has 
proven to  be a difficult  process,  with firm  evidence of  a  narrowing 
of earlier  divergencies  apparent  only within  the  last  year or  so; 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Heavy official intervention in exchange markets (especially during 
1987)  and  episodes of coordinated adjustments In interest rates——both 
undertaken in an effort to foster more stability in key—currency 
exchange rates——have been a second prominent feature of the  landscape; 
see Chart 1.  These, in combination with the monetary response to the 
global stock market crash of October 19,  1987 and plans for a liberali- 
zation of capital controls in the  European Monetary System (EMS)  by 
1992——have once again put the  spotlight on an old question:  how succes- 
sful can monetary policy be when it is asked to wear two hats, one for 
internal and the other for external balance? 
Another distinguishing characteristic of the last two—and—a—half 
years has been the sizable decline in both the nominal and real value 
of the U.S. dollar.  8y now, all of the 1980—85 real appreciation of 
the dollar (on an effective basis) has been reversed; see Chart 2. 
The central question has been:  do you think the dollar decline has 
gone far enough?  On a number of occasions  (e.g.,  Louvre, February 22, 
1987; the September 1987 meetings of the Interim Committee; and the 
0—7 statement  of December 22,  1987), officials have supplied their own 
answer——by offering a concerted view on the consistency of the exist- 
ing pattern of exchange rates with 'fundamentals."  Moreover, interest 
continues to be expressed in some reform proposals——including a 
system of target zones——that hinge on knowledge of equilibrium exchange 
rates. —  — 
Chort  1.  THe  DoLLar and  ReaL  Interest  Rates 
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Last but not least,  the period  since the Plaza  Agreement  has 
witnessed a strengthening  of international  economic policy  coordination 
among  the major countries.  Coordination  agreements  have featured both 
country—specific  policy  commitments  and official pronouncements  on the 
pattern of exchange rates,  but have not specified rules,  anchors,  or a 
center—country  for  the exchange rate system.  Debate continues  on 
whether the present  coordination  process  is merely  an intermediate 
stage on the way to a more far—reaching  rule—based  reform of the system, 
or is instead  a durable, workable compromise between  what some regard 
as  the excesses  of decentralized floating  and the straitjacket of 
fixed rates. 
3.  So much for  the landscape.  How does it relate to prospects 
for  the international  monetary system?  We would say "quite  a lot." 
Indeed,  much  of the controversy  over reform  of the system can be 
traced  back to different views about the capabilities and limitations 
of more managed exchange rates  regimes  to deal with just  the sort  of 
policy  problems  outlined above.  In our view,  four  central issues 
merit particular  attention in the Current climate: 
First,  can  the exchange rate regime  do much to help discipline 
fiscal policy; 
Second,  what are  the extent and costs  of reduced  monetary 
independence  under greater fixity of  exchange rates; 
Third, how can  the equilibrium exchange rate best be determined; 
and —6— 
Fourth,  does a well—functioning  internstional  monetary system 
explicit anchor? 
We examine each of  these  issues  in turn. 
II.  Fiscal  Policy and the Exchange  Rate Regi 
L.  The proposition  that the commitment  to defend the parity  provides 
economic agents with Increased  discipline to avoid  inflationary  policies 
is one of the oldest sod most durable  arguments for fixed  rates.  Yet 
close scrutiny  of the typical focus  of the discipline  hypothesis 
suggests that  it could be akin to Hamlet  without the Prince of Denmark. 
In what follows,  we elaborate on this point. 
2.  The traditional  province of the discipline hypothesis  is monetary 
policy.  Under  the well—known  Mundell—Fleming  model, monetary policy  is 
completely  ineffective for a small country with fixed exchange  rates  in 
a world of high capital  mobility.  This is merely one application  of 
the dictum that policymakers  who seek to achieve simultaneously  fixed 
rates, open capital  markets, and an independent  monetary policy will 
be frustrated.  The best they  can dn is to achieve any two of the 
three  objectives.  Thus,  once the choice is made for  fixed  rates  and 
open capital  markets, monetary policy  is effectively  disciplined.  The 
exchange rate could be devalued to give monetary policy  a longer leash, 
but  this  is ruled out by the assumption that  devaluation  would bring 
with it heavy  political  costs. 
More recently,  the domain of the discipline  argument has been 
extended to wage policy.  The basic idea  here is that if exchange rate 
adjustments  don't completely offset inflation  differentials,  then the —7— 
resultant real  appreciation  for  high inflation countries will deter 
exports,  real output,  and  employment——thereby acting as a disincentive 
to  excessive  wage settlements. I An interesting  and  unresolved 
question  is how long it will take to convince  workers of the downward 
slope of the labor—demand  schedule,  especially  if wage developments  are 
dominsted by insiders  with jobs rather than by outsiders without them. 
3.  Surprisingly  enough,  disciplinary effects on  fiscal policy 
have  been relatively  neglected——and  this despite the role often  attributed 
to lax fiscal policy  (particularly  in the United States)  in both the 
breakdown  of Bretton  Woods and  the large——many  would say "excessive"—— 
real appreciation  of the dollar during the 1980—85  period. 
4.  It is therefore  worth asking if and  how alternative exchange rate 
regimes  might  influence fiscal policy. 
First,  consider fixed rates.  With high capital  mobility,  a fiscal 
expansion will yield  an incipient positive  interest rate differential, 
a  capital  inflow,  and a balance of payments surplus——not  a deficit. 
Hence, exchange rate fixity  helps to finance——and  by no means 
disciplines——irresponsible  fiscal policy.  As suggested in the recent 
literature  on "speculative  attacks,  3' only if and when the markets 
expect fiscal  deficits to be monetized  will they force the authorities 
to choose between fiscal policy  adjustnent  and devaluation.  The better 
the  reputation  of  the monetary authorities,  the  longer  in coming will 
be the discipline  of markets.  In this  connection,  it is worth  observing 
that whereas the EMS has produced significant  convergence  of monetary 
policy,  convergence  of fiscal policies  has not taken place. 4I —8— 
Second,  consider the outcome under target  zunea.  Suppose the 
zones are  to  be  defended  by monetary policy.  In that case,  a fiscal 
expansion  that puts  appreciating  pressure on  the exchange rate will 
produce  a loosening of monetary policy  to keep the rate from leaving 
the zone.  Again,  the exchange rate  regime  will have exacerbated——not 
disciplined——the  basic cause  of the problem.  Only if the threatened 
departure  of the exchange rate from the zone initiates  a review  of the 
whole range of policies and if that (multilateral)  review tilts  the 
balance of power in the domestic  debate toward fiscal responsibility, 
will target  zones  discipline fiscal  policy.  This missing link between 
exchange rate movements  and fiscal  policy under target  zones  is being 
increasingly  recognized.  Note that whereas first—generation  target 
zone proposals  spoke  meinty of monetary  polLtytecond—generation 
proposals  have added a specific rule to rein in fiscal  policy;  contrast 
Williamson [1985] with Williamson  and Miller [1987]. 
What about  floating rates?  With high capital mobility, one would 
again expect  fiscal expansion  tu prompt  appreciation  of the real 
exchange rate.  Pressures for  reversal  are  then likely  to come from 
the beleaguered  traded  goods sector,  as it looks for ways to turn 
around its decline in competitiveness. The trouble here is that there 
is also the protectionist  alternative  to fiscal discipline,  which,  if 
adopted, would again follow  one inappropriate  polfcy  with another.  5/ 
The recent  U.S.  experience  is suggestive  of the difficulties associated 
with forging a dominant constituency  for fiscal reform,  and of the 
perseverance  necessary to combat  measures for quick—fix protectionist 
alternatives. —9— 
Finally,  consider the influences  operating on fiscal policy in 
a  regime of  managed  floating with international economic policy 
coordination,  One immediate advantage  is that the potential for a 
perverse  monetary policy response is reduced  since specific fiscal 
policy commitments  can  be specified directly  as part of a negotiated 
policy package.  That is,  one avoids the intermediate link between the 
exchange rate signal  and the policy  response.  But  this regime too is 
not entirely  without pitfalls.  For one  thing,  the kind of specific, 
quantitative  policy commitments  that lend themselves  to reliable 
monitoring  may be perceived  as intruding too much on national sover- 
eignty.  For another,  there is no explicit  mechanism for shsrng the 
fiscal  adjustment  across participants.  Also,  there  is the problem of 
implementation  of  fisLa'.  policy  agreements  when the responsibility for 
implementation  lies with different branches  of government in different 
countries.  6/ 
5.  The bottom  line of all this  is that if proposals for modifi- 
cation or reform  of the exchange rate system  are truly to lead  to more 
disciplined  macroeconomic policies,  more attention  has  to be given to 
how the exchange  rate regine  will impact  on fiscal  policy behavior. 
To some observers,  the answer is  that fiscal  reform  must precede reform 
of the exchange rate  system.  To nthers,  the answer  may be that  better 
fiscal  discipline  requires  mechanisms outside of the exchange rate 
system, such  as Gramm—Rudmsn legislation.  And  to still others,  the 
answer  may be that the multilateral give—and—take  encouraged by 
polIcy coordination  or a system of target  zones  is a necessary, if not —  10  — 
sufficient,  tool  for achieving greater fiscal responsibility.  One 
thing  is clear:  it will be hard to know how to shape the evolution  of 
the exchange rate  system without knowing beforehand  how to better 
discipline fiscal  policy. 
III.  Monetary Policy  Independence 
1.  As suggested  earlier, a strong  message from the theoretical 
literature  is that  a more fixed exchsnge rate regime  requires  keeping 
more of an "eye'  on the exchange rate in the conduct of domestic 
monetary policy.  What is much more controversial  is what such s 
reduced independence of monetary policy  would cost. 
2.  Concern about reduced monetary  independence  is often strongest 
in countries  with either relatively  low or relatively  high inflation 
rates.  In the former,  there is a worry  about repetition  of the latter 
days of Bretton  Woods when disequilibrium  exchange rates, heavy 
exchange market intervention,  and massive capital flows combined to 
wrestle control  of the money supply  away from the authorities.  In 
their  view,  a similar occurrence  would jeopardize both their  price— 
stability objectives  and their  hard—won anti—inflationary  reputations. 
For the high inflation countries,  there  is a concern that less  monetary 
independence  could handicap the  battle  against the cyclical  component 
of high unemployment.  In addition,  high—inflation countries  often 
suffer  from weak fiscal  systems with relatively  heavy reliance  on the 
inflation tax. J In this regard,  they worry that a lower inflation 
rate will reduce their revenue from seignorage,  run up against  tax —  11  — 
evasion in seeking  to compensate for it by raising other taxes,  and 
hence,  complicate  what are already difficult  fiscal problems. 
3.  More generally, there  is a concern that greater stability of 
exchange rates  would be purchased at the cost of both greater 
instability  of other prices in the economy——including  interest rates 
and prices  of nontraded goods,  and of a diminished capacity to use 
monetary policy  to pursue  other objectives  of policy.  For example, a 
large  hIke in interest rates  taken to protect a weak currency could 
disrupt stock  market prices.  Similarly,  a firm commitment to defend 
a given exchange rate pattern might lImit the freedom of maneuver of 
monetary authorities  in combating a weakness of certain financial 
institutions. 
4.  Some  would say that exchange market intervention  offers a 
solution to the 'two—hat  problem by introducing  an additional  policy 
instrument to handle  the  exchange rate.  Note  that  this  line of argument 
should refer  exclusively  to sterilized  intervention  since  non—sterilized 
intervention  is best regarded as monetary policy  by another  name.  Yet 
the available empirical evidence  on  sterilized  intervention  is  not 
very encouraging  to  Chose who  favor highly managed rates.  In brief, 
the Jurgensen Report  [1983  concluded  that sterilized  intervention 
is not  likely  to  have a  powerful  effect  on  the  level  of  the exchange 
rate  over  the  medium to  long run.  Thus,  while intervention may  be 
helpful  in smoothing  short—run  volatility and  in providing the market 
with a 'signal'  about the future course of policies,  8/ it is not by 
itself likely  Co deliver  monetary policy from  having to serve two 
masters. —  12  — 
5.  Another possible  way out of the box would be controls on 
international  cspital flows.  This  is indeed the route  sometimes 
taken in the  past by some  members of the  EMS, as evidenced  by the 
widening of interest  differentials (adjusted  for differences  in tax 
traatment)  between  onshore and offshore financial  instruments 
(denominated  in the same currency)  during periods of exchange rate 
crisis.  9/  No one asserts that capital controls  are costless.  The 
argument instead  is that such controls are less costly  to the  real 
side of the economy than alternative  policy  options.  In  fact,  Tobin's 
[19801  "sand—in—the—wheels"  proposal for an international  round—tripping 
tax on all capital  flows  employs just this  rationale. 
In our view,  the case for capital controls is a weak one, on at 
least five counts. 
First,  the benefits from liberalization  of capital controls appear 
to be substantial,  including  higher real returns to savers,  smaller 
spreads between borrowing  and lending  rates,  a lower cost of capital to 
firma,  better  hedging possibilities  against a variety of risks, and a 
more efficient  allocation of investment.  10/ 
Second,  capital controls themselves  induce changes  in financial 
structure  and rent—seeking  activities that  make it difficult to 
subsequently  reverse them;  yet the longer they  stay in place,  the more 
serious the distortions  associated  with them. 
Third, there  is no effective way to separate a priori  productive 
from nonproductive  capital flows.  Also, the costs of an inappropriate 
classification  could be large.  In this connection,  if some speculators —  13  — 
are deterred  from  seeing through the 'J-curve,"  exchange market 
stability  could  be adversely affected——a  result directly opposite  to 
the original rationale for controls. 
Fourth,  since controls are seldom  negotiated  on  a  multilateral 
basis,  they can  poison  the atmosphere  for  advances in coordination  and 
cooperation in other areas; in particular,  controls on  capital  flows 
run counter to  the development of  an outward—looking policy strategy. 
Fifth,  round—tripping  taxes  are neIther practical nor desirable. 
To  work,  such  taxes  need  to  be applied universally; yet an incentive 
always  exists  for some country not  to impose the tax and thereby to 
capture  much of other countries' business,  i.e.,  their  effectiveness 
will be diminished  by 'reguiatory  arbitrage.'  UI  Also,  they would 
require a  country that  wishes  to  attract a  capital inflow to raise 
interest  rates even more,  to  offset  the effect of  the  tax,  thereby 
possibly increasing  the variability  of interest rates. 
6.  Yet another tack  would be to assign fiscal  policy to internal 
balance so that  monetary policy  can concentrate  more on the exchange 
rate.  Such an argument, however, faces  two immediate problems.  One is 
that fiscal policy  is considerably  less  flexible than  monetary policy 
in almost  all industrial  countries;  contrast,  for example,  the frequency 
in  the United States  of meetings of the FOMC with the  frequency  of 
budget  submissions  to Congress.  The other problem is that fiscal 
policy  is not oriented to short—run stabilization  goals  in most 
industrial  countries;  it is instead guided  by other considerations 
(e.g.,  reducing the share of government  in GDF,  reducing the burden  of —  14  — 
taxation,  etc.)  that often become  objectives  in themselves.  For these 
reasons, it is hard to think  of fiscal  policy  as a close  substitute 
for monetary poiicy. 
7.  Thus  far, we have outlined  some of the costs  and  trade—offs  that 
might be associated  with less independent  monetary policy.  There is, 
however, another side of the issue that sees both the loss and 
consequences  of monetary independence under  greater exchange  rate fixity 
as much less serious.  Advocates of this position  make the following 
points: 
First, the independence of monetary policy  disappears  once the 
exchange rate is transformed  from a policy  instrument to a policy 
target.  Experience  suggests that few countries are able to treat the 
exchange rate with "benign  neglect" once it moves by a large  smount.  12/ 
Second,  increased independence  of monetary policy  is not synonymous 
with increased  effectiveness.  The true  constraint  on the latter is not 
the exchange rate  regime  but instead  the openness of national economies, 
particularly  high international capital  mobility.  With floating rates, 
exchange rates  respond rapidly to perceived  changes in monetary policy; 
nominal wages  and prices adjust  rapidly to changes in exchange  rates; 
and the invariance  of real wages to exchange rate changes——guaranteed 
over the long run by the homogeneity  postulate——limits  the effects of 
monetary policy  on real output and employment.  13/  In the end, the real 
choice is betveen accepting reasonable  constraints  beforehand  or having 
them imposed at higher cost later by markets. 14/ —  15  — 
Third,  the inflexibility  of fiscal  policy  is an asset——not a 
lIability——in  a world of inflation—prone  authorities.  Growth  and  price 
stabilIty will be best served  when fiscal policy is put on a steady, 
medium—term  course.  If there  is an unusual situation that is widely 
recognIzed  as calling  for a shorter—term adjustment  of fiscal  policy, 
it can be accomplished  (witness recent temporary  departures  from the 
medium—term path of fiscal  consolidation  in Japan  and in the Federal 
Republic of Germany). 
8.  To sum up,  the real issue is not whether monetary policy  is 
capable of restoring  more stability to exchange rates,  Surely it can. 
It is instead what one has to  give up in terms  of other objectives to 
get it.  To some  observers, that shadow price  is too high and they 
would therefore  prefer to live with a "natural  degree of exchange 
rate stability——much  in the way that one  accepts  a  "natural'  rate of 
unemployment.  To others,  the exchange rate regime  cannot take away 
what is no longer there in any case,  namely, the  ability of monetary 
policy to influence  real output and employment  in the long run under 
conditions  of high capital  mobility.  Again, the view that prevails 
in the end will have a lot  to do with the structure  of any modification 
or reform  of the exchange  rate system. 
IV.  Identifying Equilibrium  Exchange Rates 
1.  As highlighted  in our earlier snapshot of  key  developments in 
the world economy,  the 1980s  have been  marked by large swings in major 
currency exchange rates.  One popular position has  been that  these 
currency swings have been subject to large and persistent  misalignments, —  16  — 
where  by  "misalignment"  one  means  a departure  of the actual  (real) 
exchange rate from its  equilibrium  level.  One implication  of this 
view is that the exchange rate is too important  a relative price to be 
left entirely to the market and therefore  that  officials should  guide 
the market by supplying  it with their own concerted view of the 
equilibrium  rate.  An opposing position is that  the very concept of an 
equilibrium  exchange  rate different  from the market rate is so riddled 
with conceptual  and empirical  problems as to render it operationally 
vacuous. 15/ 
2.  The case that the equilibrium  exchange rate  may differ from the 
rate generated  by the free operation  of the marketplace  rests on a 
number of  arguments: 
One  is that the equilibrium rate should reflect the sustainability 
of  policies.  16/  For example, if the market exchange rate reflects  an 
unsustainable  budget  deficit, then this rate  may not be considered as 
an equilibrium  even though  it clears  demand  and supply in the market. 
A  second  rationale for rejecting the market rate as an equilibrium 
rate is that it may imply undesirable  values for certain objectives  of 
policy,  such as unemployment,  growth,  or the degree of restriction  in 
goods and capital  markets.  Nurkse [19451,  for example,  defined the 
equilibrium  rate as the  rate  that  would produce equilibrium in the 
balance of payments,  without wholesale unemployment,  undue restrictions 
on trade, or special  incentives  to incoming or outgoing capital. 
The existence  of market imperfections  represents  another possible 
reason for eschewing the market's verdict, this  time on second—best 
considerations.  Specifically,  the existence  of imperfect labor —  17  — 
mobility  is sometimes  put  forward  as a reason  for  concluding  that  the 
market rate is too  "noisy,"  17/  and that exchange rate stability  shares 
certain "public  good" attributes.  18/ 
The recent  literature  on "speculative  bubbles"  can also be seen as 
antagonistic  to the market—rate—is—the—right—rate  position  by 
demonstrating that  models of profitable  destabilizing  speculation  can 
exist. 
On the empirical  side,  there is likewise  by now a large body of 
empirical  work which suggests that there  have been periods over the 
past 15 years when the market's evaluation  of the equilibrium  rate was 
considerably  different from the sustainable  rate (Krugman [1985]),  or 
when it was difficult ex post to explain actual  rate movements in 
terms  of "fundamentals"  (Buiter  and Miller [1983]), 
Finally,  even if one did want to look to the market for the 
equilibrium  rate,  opponents of floating  rates point out  the market rate 
is distorted by  a variety of official interventions  that render  it 
a far cry from s "clean  float."  Since  there  are many ways to skin a 
cat and since  it is hard to envisage  a prohibition  on all such inter— 
ventons, the market rate is,  in their  view,  of limited  use. 
3.  Still,  it takes  an estimate to beat an estimate.  That is, if 
the market's view is rejected, then authorities  need to supply  their 
own estimate of the equilibrium  rate.  What then are the leading 
approaches?  12/ 
Perhaps  the most long—lived  is the purchasing—power—parity  (PPP) 
approach.  This can be expected to generate reasonable  estimates if one —  18  — 
can identify an equilibrium base  period and if all shocks  between the 
base and  current  periods are monetary in origin.  But when there are real. 
shocks,  one  normally  wants  a  departure from PPP.  Trend inter—country 
differences in labor productivity  (not  just in tradables relative to 
nontradables  a la Balassa [19641  but in tradables  as well);  20/ 
permanent  changes  in the  terms  of trade;  and shifts  from net creditor 
to net debtor  positions——are  just some  of the real factors that call 
for a change  in real exchange rates.  In this  sense,  it can be 
hazardous to assume that the equilibrium  exchange rate is constant  over 
time. 
A  second option  is to resort to structural  models of exchange  rate 
determination  to produce  estimates of the exchange rate consistent  with 
fundamentals.  The fly in the ointment  here,  aside from measurement 
problems for some of the right—hand  side variables,  is  that  these 
models——be they  of the monetary  or portfolio balance variety——have 
been shown to possess  poor out—of—sample  forecasting  properties.  21/ 
But why then  should markets trust  them as reliable indicators  of 
equilibrium  rates? 
Yet a third  way to go is to use an econometric  trade  model to 
solve for the level  of the exchange rate that——given  anticipated 
real output and inflation  paths over the next 18 months  or so,  and given 
any relative  price  effects still "in the pipe——will  produce  a current 
account equal  to "normal capital  flows."  This is often referred to as 
the underlying  balance  approach.  The main sticking point with this 
approach,  aside from the wide range  of estimates  of  trade —  19  — 
elasticities,  22/  is the need to estimate "normal  capital  flows.'  Given 
the instability  of perceived investment  opportunities  across  countries 
and over time,  it is hard to say if,  for example,  the United States 
should be regarded  as a net capital exporter  or a net capital  importer, 
and if the latter,  whether normal  inflows are $10 billion or $100 
billion. 
4.  All of this suggests——at  least to us——that estimates  of equi- 
librium exchange rates  could be subject to rather substantial  margins 
of error, and that official  estimates  of equilibrium  rates should  be 
allowed to change  over time in response to changes in real economic 
conditions.  Those who favor  a modification  or reform  of the exchange 
rate system therefore  need to ponder two questions:  (i) are official 
estimates of the equilibrium  exchange rate likely to be better  on 
average than the market's estimate,  and (ii) would a moving official 
estimate of the equilibrium  exchange rate  with a relatively  wide band 
be helpful as an anchor for medium—term  expectations  about exchange 
rates?  If both these  questions  can be answered in the affirmative, 
then the recent  evolution  of the system toward  more "management'  and 
more "fixity" of exchange rates  is likely to continue.  If not,  then 
strong reliance  on the market to determine the right exchange rate, 
like democracy,  may be the worst system——except  for all the others. 
V.  Leaders, Rules and Anchors 
1.  The strengthening  of international  economic policy coordination 
that began in earnest at the Plaza  in September 1985  represents,  as 
noted above,  a move in the direction of more cooperative  management of —  20  — 
the  system.  Yet some might describe present  arrangements as a "non— 
system"  because  relative to, say,  Bretton  Woods  or the EMS,  there  is a 
less formal  structure,  no acknowledged  leader,  and no explicit anchor. 
It is therefore  of interest to consider  whether such factors are likely 
to influence  the effectiveness  of an exchange rate system. 
2.  A convenient  way of characterizing  the Bretton Woods system is 
as an "implicit  contract"  between the leading country, or hegemon, and 
the satellite  countries. 23/  The leader accepted the obligation to conduct 
its macroeconomic  policies in a prudent, stable  way——perhaps best 
summarized  by a steady,  low rate of inflation.  This obligation was 
also reinforced  by the  leader's commitment  to peg some nominal price——in 
this case,  the price of gold.  Since there  were only N—l  separate  exchange 
rates  among  N currencies,  the  leader  was paasive about his  exchange rate. 
The satellite  countries  were committed  to peg  their  exchange ratea within 
agreed  margins  to the leader.  As a reaction to the competitive  depre- 
ciations  of the l930s, all exchange rate adjustments  were placed  under 
international  supervision  and were to be undertakan  under  conditions 
of "fundamental  disequilibrium." As a consequence  of their  exchange 
rate obligations,  the satellites  gave up independence  in their  monerary 
policies but received the assurance  that they had  hitched their  wagons 
to an engine  that wouid stay on the  tracks.  Under  this  implicit contract, 
both sides can be said to be "disciplined"  by their obligations and 
both  share any efficiency gains  associated  with moving closer to an 
international  money. —  21  — 
With the benefit of hindsight,  it is apparent that such implicit 
contracts  can come under strain from a number  of directions (in 
addition to Triffin's [1960]  well—known  confidence  probLem").  One 
such strain is a breakdown of discipline by the leader  such that the 
satellites  come to see it as exporting  inflation  rather than  stability. 
The satellites  are  then likely to sever their  links  with the  leader  and 
to seek stability through other mechanisms,  including  money—supply 
targeting  and regional exchange rate arrangements  with a more stable 
leader.  A  second strain is a change  in underlying  conditions  that 
calls for  a change  in the  real exchange rate between the leader  and some 
of the satellites to restore external  balance.  If that equilibrating 
change in  the real exchange rate is blocked by too much r!gid!ty of 
nominal exchange  rates (in surplus  satellite  countries),  then the 
leader  is apt  to abandon his commitment  to be passive about the exchange 
rate. 
3.  The European Monetary System (EMS)  like Bretton Woods, places 
exchange rate adjustments under  common  supervision.  It also has clear 
rules about the intervention obligations  of members.  While there  is 
no formal leader,  many observers regard the Federal Republic of Germany 
(and its  Bundesbank)  as the de facto  or acknowledged  leader. 24/  In 
this sense, it might be regarded  as a system  with informal hegemony. 
The implicit contract is similar n  many ways to that under Bretton 
Woods.  Germany follows macroeconomic policies  that "export" price 
stability  and anti—inflationary credibility  to the others.  It is 
noteworthy that while there  have been 11 realignments  within the EMS, —  22  — 
none  of them has  resulted n  a revaluation  relative to the deutsche 
mark,  thus leaving Germany's reputation  aa an exporter of stability 
intact.  Other EMS members  are  often  described as  tying  their  hands" 
on domestic  monetary policy.  Exchangs rate realignments  may not 
always provide full compensation for  past inflation differentials.  In 
this way,  the resulting real  appreciation  for  high inflation  countries 
can  act as a disincentive to  inflation,  while low inflation  countries 
receive  a gain in competitiveness  that provides some compensation  for 
their  export  of anti—inflationary  credibility. Monetary policy  in 
Germany is typically regarded  as the anchor. 
4.  While there  clearly  have been periods when large countries  have 
exerted a  stabilizing  influence  on  the  system,  it would,  in our  view, 
be  erroneous  to  conclude  that  hegemony is a  necessary characteristic 
of  s  well—functioning  international monetary  system.  For  one  thing, 
Eichengreen's  [19871  careful study  of alleged hegemonic systems, 
including the gold standard,  reveals  that the amount nf coordination 
needed for smooth functioning  was substantisl.  A case in point  is  the 
coordinated  action of last Fall  in the EMS when Germany and the 
Netherlands  lowered their  interest  rates,  while France raised  its  rate. 
Second,  the appearance  of hegemony  can sometimes result as much from 
common objectives  as from  aavnmetries  in economic size or reputation 
among countries.  Again,  the  EMS  serves as  a  fascinating laboratory. 
In the early l980s,  disinflation  was  the  top  priority in virtually  all 
EMS  countries.  Since  Germany had  the best reputation for  price 
stability,  there  was  a  commonality of  interests  in trying to converge —  23  — 
to  the German  Inflation  rate.  Now,  however, some  observers (e.g., 
Dornbusch 11988])  argue that given both the progress  already made on the 
inflatIon front  and  the high unemployment  rates  prevailing  in some EMS 
(and potential  EMS) countries,  it is time to give greater weight to 
objectives  other than  inflatIon.  To some,  such a decision would 
inevitably result  in a more symmetric  EMS.  Indeed,  these observers 
(e.g.,  Holtham et al [1987])  view the proposals  on the EMS put  forward 
to the EC Monetary  Committee last Fall by Minister  Balladur of France 
as prefacIng  such a development  of the EMS. 
5.  The system  of floating rates that replaced  Bretton Woods in 
1973 could  be  said  to have its own implicit contract.  This contract 
suggested that each country should adopt sound and  stable macroeconomic 
policies at the national  level,  with the expectation  that stability of 
exchange  markets would emerge as a useful by—product.  In the event, 
some major countries  did not adopt sound and stable policies  at the 
national level, spillovers or externalities  associated  with these 
poor policies  were significant (including  protectionIst  pressures), 
and exchange rates  displayed considerable  volatility.  In this 
decentralized system,  there  was no acknowledged  leader.  National 
macroeconomic policies  served as anchors.  The fact that intervention 
practices  were sometimes  different and uncoordinated  led some (McKinnon 
[1984])  to argue  that an upward rise  was imparted  to the world money 
supply. 
6.  The perceived  inadequacies of the decentralized  floating rate 
system were,  not surprisingly,  the impetus for the move to stronger —  24  — 
international  economic policy coordination.  The  rationale  behind the 
coordination process——and  we think  it can only be regarded as an 
evolving process——is  that you need a mechanism to internalize the 
externalities  of policy  actions by the larger  countries. 25/  Specifi- 
cally,  multilateral surveillance  is employed to see that  the interna- 
tional spillovers——both  good and bad——of each country's policies—— 
including the feedback of these  spillovers to the  country itself——are 
taken into sccount in the final,  multilateral policy  bargain.  In some 
cases,  countries  may also be able to use "peer pressure" to help them 
take policy  actions that are unpopular domestically  but which are 
beneficial  to them in the long run. 26/ 
Although successive  coordination  agreements  share several common 
elements (policy commitments,  a concerted  view on exchange rate 
developments,  and pledges  for closer  cooperation  on exchange  market 
intervention),  there  are no explicit rules that apply across agree- 
ments.  This flexibility  carries both advantages  and  disadvantages.  On 
the one hand, the agreements  can cover  a broad range  of policies 
(including  structural  as well as macroeconomic policies),  they can be 
quite country—specific  and quantitative,  and they can be custom— 
tailored to the most pressing problems  of the day.  On the other hand, 
without rules  there  are higher negotiation  and recontracting  coats. 
Countries'  monetary  and fiscal  policies  serve as anchors in this 
system.  Recently, however,  U.S. Treasury Secretary  Baker and U.K. 
Chancellor  Lawson suggested the possible use of a commodity—price 
basket indicator as an early warning signal of future aggregate  price 
developments.  This might provide some assurance  that stabilization  of —  25  — 
exchange markets  does not come at the expense  of either  globsi inflation 
or deflation. 
Another recent and noteworthy  Innovation  in the coordination 
exercise is the consideration  of aggregate indicators  for the G—7 
countries  as a group.  Their rationale is straightforward: even when 
members  of the coordination  group reach  agreements  that  are viewed as 
mutually beneficial,  care still needs to be taken  to ensure that such 
policy  packages  have satisfactory implications  for those not at the 
table.  This  is particularly relevant in the case of the G—7 countries 
since the spillover  effects of their  policies  on the rest of the world 
are known to be large.  Aggregate indicators,  covering such variables 
as G—7  growth  rates,  C—i  interest rates,  the C—7 current account, and 
the C—i real exchange rate are simply  an analytical  vehicle for getting 
a better  handle  on these spillovers.  In this connection,  it is well 
to remember  that there  is a debt problem as well as a problem of improv- 
ing the functioning  of the international  monetary  system, and measures 
introduced  to alleviate one will inevitably  affect the other. 
VI.  Concluding  Remarks 
It follows  from the  preceding remarks  that  we do not view refori&of 
the international  monetary system as an instrument  of crisis management. 
Instead,  we see it as akin to a constitutional  change that should  be 
governed by a long—term  perspective.  In keeping with that orientation, 
there is much to be gained by subjecting  all proposals for modification of 
the system  to careful scrutiny and study so that their full implications—— 
both positive and negative——can be fully understood. —  26  — 
*1  An earlier version of this paper was presented at  the  Cato 
Institute's  Sixth Annual Monetary Conference on "Dollars, Deficits, 
and Trade: The Changing World Economy," held in Washington, D.C. 
on February 25—26, 1988. 
1/  The issue of whether the consequences of a more expansionary 
monetary  policy will be as visible under a fixed rate as under flexible 
rates is discussed  in Frenkel and Goldstein [1986]. 
2/  See Giavazzi  and Giovannini [1988]. 
3/  See Flood and Garber [1980]  for a model of such speculative 
attacks. 
4/  See Holtham et al.  [1987]. 
5/  Obstfeld  [1985]. 
6/  See Feldstein  [19871. 
7/  See Frenkel [1975] and Dornbusch [1988]. 
8/  See bissa [1981]. 
9/  See Giavazzi and Giovannini [1988]. 
10/  See  Folkerts—Landau and Mathieson [1988]. 
11/  See Levich [1987]. 
12/  See Goldstein  [19801. 
13/  For an elaboration of these considerations, see Frenkel and Mussa 
[1981] and Frenkel [1983]. 
14/  See Duisenberg  [1988]. 
15/  See Haberler  [1987]. 
16/  See  Frenkel  [1987]. —  27 
— 
17/  For an empirical attempt  to judge whether actual exchange rates 
are too noisy in terms of departures  from fundamentals generated  by a 
monetary model of exchange rate determination, see West [1987]. 
18/  See Frenkal, Goldstein and Masson [1988]. 
19/  See Goldstein  [19841 and  Frenkel and Goldstein [1986] for more 
comprehensive discussions of  alternative methods  for estimating the 
equilibrium exchange rate. 
20/  See Marston [1986] for an empirical analysis of trend differences 
in labor productivity in tradables  as between the United States and 
Japan, and for evidence on the drawbacks of measures of competitiveness 
that rely on broad price indices such as the CPI.  On the broader issues 
concerning  the limitations of the PPP approach, see Frenkal and Mussa 
[1980] and Frenkel  [1981]. 
21/  See  Meese and Rogoff [1983]. 
22/  See Goldstein and Khan  [1985] for a survey of trade elasticities. 
23/  See Frenkel  and Goldstein  [1988]. 
24/  See Giavazzi and Giovannini.  [1986]. 
25/  See  Frenkel,  Goldstein, and Masson [1988]. 
26/  See Haberler  [1987] for a  different view on peer pressure. —  28  — 
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